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Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of the institutional framework of Malaysia's federal Public
Accounts Committee (PAC), and the Committee's role in enhancing public sector
accountability. The development of the PAC and its relationship to the government structure
in Malaysia are discussed alongside other institutions within the administrative framework of
accountability. These include the Accountant General's Department and the National Audit
Department. A description of the PAC's powers, responsibilities, membership and working
practices precedes a discussion on its effectiveness in supporting the enhancement of
accountability. In addition, this chapter also cites cases examined by the PAC that were
highlighted in the media.
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Introduction
There has been an increase, over time, in the public demand for government transparency and
accountability. Haque (1994) wrote that accountability is crucial to safeguarding the public
sector's image of serving the public interest. McGee and Gaventa (2010, p. 5) wrote that the
field of government transparency and accountability is 'alive with rapidly emerging citizen-
led and multistakeholder initiatives.' The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)
also published a policy paper urging governments to implement institutional arrangements
necessary for the enhancement of public sector financial management transparency and
accountability (IFAC, 2012). The Malaysian government has been very responsive to the
increasing demand for greater government accountability and transparency. In 1998, the
government implemented the Prime Minister's Directive No.1, aimed at enhancing the
integrity of management in government administration (Ahmad Badawi, 2004). The National
Integrity Plan (NIP) and the Malaysian Institute of Integrity were launched in 2004 by then
Prime Minister Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi to further realize Vision 2020's goal of
creating an ethical and moral society. In 2009, Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak introduced
Ministerial Key Performance Indicators (MKPls) focused on delivering results in the effort to
enhance government accountability. Subsequently, in 2010, the Prime Minister formally
announced the Government Transformation Programme (GTP). The GTP covers an initial six
national key results areas (NKRAs), including an initiative to fight corruption (PEMANDU,
2010). The NKRAs were identified based on the evaluation of demands from the public
obtained through surveys of citizens.
Administratively, the two main institutions responsible for public finance accountability in
Malaysia are the National Audit Department (NAO) and the Public Accounts Committee
(PAC). This chapter aims to introduce the PAC and its role in ensuring the accountability of
Malaysia's federal government. In Malaysia, PACs are established by both federal and state
governments. At the federal level, the PAC is established as a committee under Parliament,
while at the state level, the PAC is established by the state's legislative assembly. Since more
than 80 percent of public revenue is collected by the federal government, the emphasis on
accountability should be applied more on the federal government relative to other levels of
government. Thus, the discussions in this chapter focus on the PAC at the federal level.
This chapter provides a description of the role, responsibility, authority, functions, and
performance of the Malaysia'S federal PAC. Published studies on PACs are referenced to
provide a more complete understanding of their roles. Several studies conducted in various
countries have assessed performance in terms of the factors that determine the efficiency and
effectiveness of PACs. These include McGee (2002), Stapenhurst et al. (2005), Hedger and
Blick (2008), Stapenhurst and Kroon (2011), Pelizzo (2011) and Makhado, Mashela and
Mokhari (2012). McGee (2002) concluded that there are two important elements in a public
accountability system: the office of the Auditor General, and a parliamentary oversight
committee (referred to as the PAC). Stapenhurst et al. (2005) extended the McGee (2002)
study and identified 17 attributes of an ideal PAC that they believed deliver both efficiency
and effectiveness. This chapter, in particular, uses the attributes developed by Stapenhurst et
al. (2005) to assess whether Malaysia's federal PAC can be considered ideal or otherwise.
The remainder of this chapter is organized into five sections. The next section explains the
context in which the PAC operates. Section 3 describes the methodology used to gather
information about Malaysia's federal PAC. It is followed by findings and discussions in
Section 4. Section 5 ends the chapter with a conclusion.
Context and Background
This section starts with a brief description of Malaysia's government structure under the
provisions of the Federal Constitution, followed by a discussion on the institutional
arrangements related to ensuring government accountability. Malaysia is a member of the
Commonwealth Association and gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1957.
Politically, Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy with an elected Parliament. The Malaysian
public sector was established in accordance with the Federal Constitution, which established
three tiers of government: federal, state and local governments. The federal government
controls external affairs, defence, internal security, civil and criminal law, citizenship,
finance, commerce and industry, shipping, education, health and labour. The Cabinet, headed
by the Prime Minister, is the highest co-coordinating executive body of all government
activities and interests. The Cabinet is collectively responsible to Parliament. Adopting the
Westminster bicameral parliamentary system, Malaysia'S Parliament consists of two houses:
the Senate (upper house), and the House of Representatives (lower house). Article 43(2)(a) of
the Constitution stipulates that the Prime Minister is appointed from members of the House of
Representatives (Laws of Malaysia, 2010).
Unicameral systems exist at the state level, where an Executive Council headed by a Chief
Minister is the highest coordinating body for state matters. The Council is responsible to the
state's legislative assembly. The state secretariat and other state/central government
departments assist the Executive Council in the administration of the state's affairs. Each of
the states has its own constitution, which must be compatible with the Federal Constitution.
Local governments often referred to as local authorities, have been established under the
jurisdiction of the state governments. Local authorities are primarily concerned with the
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environment, including providing services such as street cleaning, the collection and disposal
of solid waste and sewage; the provision of public amenities such as parks and markets;
public health including the licensing of hawkers and shops.
The significant role played by the public sector in the Malaysian economy can be determined
by examining government expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic products (GOP).
The 2013 public sector accounts reported consolidated operating expenditures of RM211.3
billion, representing almost 22 percent of that year's GDP. The general government's
development expenditures were reported to be RM42.2 billion, representing 4 percent of
GOP. Over the years, the government's total operating and development expenditures have
remained at almost 25 percent of GOP. In terms of employment, the expenditure on
emoluments for the federal government's 1.4 million civil servants accounted for 28.5
percent of operating expenditures (Ministry of Finance, 2014). The allocation of resources
between governments in Malaysia is very centralized. The federal government accounts for
around 83 percent of the country's total public revenue. In terms of operating expenditures,
the federal government spends a significantly larger amount that is slightly more than 90
percent of the total general government operating expenditure (Ministry of Finance, 2014).
The Federal Constitution sets out the rules regarding financial provisions under Articles 96 to
112. The government must table an annual budget for approval by Parliament. Following is a
summary of financial provisions contained in the Constitution:
1. There can be no taxation or loans without the consent of Parliament.
2. Consolidated fund: all public moneys must be put in one consolidated fund.
3. Parliamentary appropriation: no payment can be issued out of the consolidated fund
except as authorised by Parliament.
4. Annual budgets must be tabled in and approved by Parliament.
5. Annual accounts must be prepared and audited, to be tabled and passed by Parliament.
The above discussions show the importance of parliamentary controls. Parliament enacts,
repeals and amends laws related to financial matters. It controls expenditures through
budgeting, and it requires the Accountant General's Department (AGD) to table annual
financial reports in Parliament. These reports must be audited by an oversight body, which is
the NAD. In addition, Parliament has established the PAC to ensure accountability. The
administrative arrangements related to accountability are discussed next.
Administrative Arrangements for Accountability
The use of money by the public sector starts from the preparation of the budget at the
Treasury, approval of the budget by Parliament, allocation of resources through central
agencies to the various departments and agencies and the preparation of accounts. The
accounts, prepared by the AGD, are audited by the Auditor General. These audited accounts,
are tabled together with the Auditor General's Report in Parliament. The Auditor General
will also brief the PAC on issues arising from his report. The federal government's
accountability framework is shown in Figure 1.
3
..............................................................
Parliament
Answers
to Audit
Report
................................... Public Accounts
Committee
Audit
Report
Audited
Financial
Statement Budget
Financial
Statement General Warrant!
r-~----' r----~--, Warrant Budget :SubWarrantr--~-, r---~~ .--------,National
Audit
Department
Accountant
General's
Department
~
I
I
I
Ministries/
Department - ResponsibilityCentre_ TreasuryCall L- ...J
Circular
1-.....:.-
!
I
Expendituretl
Revenue .
Daily Data
Transmission I
~AuditReport IL._._._._._._._._._._._._._._~_._. Accounting
Offices
Figure 1: Financial Accountability in Malaysia's Federal Government
Source: Saleh (2002)
The Accountant General's Department (AGO)
The AGD is a department under Malaysia's Ministry of Finance (MOF). It was set up in
1947, at which time the first Accountant General was appointed. In order to facilitate the
control of financial transactions and ensure efficient and timely services (including the
preparation of accounts), the AGO has 25 branches located throughout the country. As
described in Section 3 of the Treasury Instructions (TI) I, the Accountant General is the
federal government's principal accountant, with authority over any issues related to
accounting and the accounts of both the federal and state governments (Laws of Malaysia,
2008). One of the functions of the AGO is to prepare the financial statements of the federal
government. In addition, the AGO also ensures that in preparing the financial statements of
the state governments, the state treasurers or accountants comply with the regulations and
provisions of the same Constitution and legislation that apply to the federal government. The
I The Treasury Instructions (TIs) provide details on financial and accounting procedures. They encompass the
regulations to be adhered to in the management of government funds. As stated in Section 4 of the Financial
Procedure Act 1957, "Every accounting officer shall be subject to this Act and shall perform such duties, keep
such books and render such accounts as may be prescribed by or under this Act or by instructions issued by the
Treasury in matters of financial and accounting procedure not inconsistent therewith." (Laws of Malaysia,
2006b).
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AGD manages accounting personnel for the government sector, including the appointment of
state treasurers and accountants. They are, in tum, accountable to the Accountant General
(Saleh, 2002).
The most recent development related to the AGD is the decision to move to accrual
accounting. The decision was made in 2010, when accrual accounting was identified as one
of the policy measures for public sector transformation. The new accounting system is
expected to improve financial management - asset-liability management in"particular - and
subsequently enhance government accountability (Saleh, 2013). In the implementation of
accrual accounting, the government has decided to adopt the International Public Sector
Accounting Standards (lPSAS) and modify them to suit the Malaysian environment.
The National Audit Department (NAD)
The British administration set up the Auditor General's institution in the early 19th century to
strengthen government financial administration. The audit function mainly involves the
certification of accounts and the maintenance of records (NAD, 2014b). After Malaysia's
independence, the institution was renamed the National Audit Department. The NAD is
responsible for ensuring accountability in the administration and management of public funds
through the audit of the accounts and activities of the federal government, state governments,
statutory bodies, local authorities, Islamic religious councils and other public entities. This is
stated in Article 106 of the Constitution, and in Section 1 of the Audit Act 1957 (Revised
1972) (Laws of Malaysia, 2006a).
The head ofthe NAD is the Auditor General, who is appointed by the Yang di Pertuan Agong
(the ruler) in accordance with Article 105 of the Federal Constitution, which specifies:
(1) There shall be an Auditor General, who shall be appointed by the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong on the advice of the Prime Minister, and after consultation
with the Conference of Rulers.
(2) A person who has held the office of Auditor General shall be eligible for
re-appointment, but shall not be eligible for any other appointment in the
service of the Federation or for any appointment in the service of a state.
(3) The Auditor General may resign his office at any time but shall not be
removed from office except on like grounds and in a like manner as ajudge of
the Federal Court.
The independence of the Auditor General is ensured through the provisions of the Federal
Constitution and the Audit Act 1957 (Revised 1972). The Auditor General is appointed by
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and reports directly to Parliament. Article 106 of the Constitution
specifies the powers and duties of the Auditor General as follows:
(1) The accounts of the Federation and of the States shall be audited and
reported on by the Auditor General.
(2) The Auditor General shall perform such other duties and exercise such
powers in relation to the accounts of the Federation and of the States and to
the accounts of other public authorities and of those bodies which are
specified by order made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, as may be provided
by federal law.
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Upon the completion of his audit of the financial statements of the federal and state
governments, the Auditor General must submit an audit report as specified in Article 107 of
the Constitution:
(1) The Auditor General shall submit his reports to the Yang di-Pertuan
Agong, who shall cause them to be laid before the House of Representatives.
(2) A copy of any such report relating to the accounts of a State or to the
accounts of any public authority exercising powers conferred by the State
law, shall be submitted to the Ruler or Yang di-Pertua Negeri of that State,
who shall cause it to be laid before the Legislative Assembly.
The scope of government auditing includes attestation, compliance and performance audits.
The nature of an audit is specified in Section 6 of the Audit Act 1957, which states that the
Auditor General must ascertain:
1. whether all reasonable precautions have been taken to safeguard the
collection and custody of public moneys or other moneys subject to his audit;
2. whether issues and payments of moneys subject to his audit were made in
accordance with proper authority and payments were properly chargeable and
are supported by sufficient vouchers or proof of payment;
3. whether due care has been taken to account for and to ensure proper use,
control, maintenance and disposal of all public stores or other stores subject
to his audit;
4. whether all accounts and other records have been and are properly and
faithfully maintained;
5. whether in his opinion moneys have been applied to the purposes for which
they were appropriated or authorized and the activities related to such
purposes were carried out or managed in an efficient manner with due regard
for economy and the avoidance of waste or extravagance;
6. whether the provisions of the Federal Constitution and the Financial
Procedure Act 1957, and any other written law relating to moneys or stores
subject to his audit have been in all respects complied with.
•
It is noted that the Act does not refer to auditing standards. However, as a member of the
International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTO SAl), the NAD has adopted
the International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAI 1000 - 1999) in performing
its audit functions (NAD, 20 14b).
Several initiatives have been undertaken by the Auditor General and the NAD to enhance
accountability. In 2008, the Auditor General introduced the financial management
accountability index (FMAI). The index ranks financial management practices of ministries,
departments and agencies and should serve as a benchmark for self-improvement (Abu Bakar
and Ismail, 2011). The Auditor General tables two types of report: the AG's report on the
financial statements and financial management, and the AG's report on the activities of the
ministries, departments and agencies of the federal and state governments. As recommended
by the GTP, the Auditor General tabled his report on activities in a three-part series starting
from 2013, and tables it as and when Parliament meets (NAD, 2014b). This allows for
speedier follow up on issues raised by the audit. The relevant ministry is expected to issue a
feedback report containing its comments and outlining action taken on the issues raised by
the auditor. Another NAD initiative to ensure accountability is the Auditor General's
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Dashboard. The Dashboard is an online monitoring channel that oversees and reports on the
actions taken by government agencies on the audit report (Arukesamy, 2013). The above
initiatives were hoped to enhance transparency and accountability of the government.
Public Accounts Committee (PAC)
As a committee of Parliament, the PAC works closely with the NAD. It examines public
accounts and responds to the Auditor General's reports on issues involving the
misappropriation of public funds, and government inefficiency and/or ineffectiveness.
Detailed information on the PAC, including its establishment, membership, powers and
functions is provided in Section 4. The Committee is identified here, however, in order to
emphasise its role in the management of public sector finance. The next section briefly
explains the methodology used to gather information about the PAC.
Methodology
The objective of this chapter is to describe the roles, responsibilities and performance of
Malaysia's federal PAC. A pragmatic approach to data collection was used whereby the
author did what was necessary to arrive at the objective of describing the PAC's roles and
effectiveness. Data in this chapter were gathered through archival searches of government
pronouncements, circulars, reports and articles. Documents collected for the purpose of this
chapter came from several websites, including the PAC website (www.parlimen.gov.my/pac)
and the NAD website (www.audit.gov.my). The PAC website provides official reports
summarising its investigations and conclusions with respect to highlighted cases, as well as
news related to issues and PAC action. The NAD's website supplies information on the audit
reports it has issued, and highlights controversial areas in their investigations. The discussion
concerning the roles and performance of the PAC in Malaysia is descriptive. A focus group
discussion was held with parliamentary officers with responsibility for attending to the needs
of the PAC. The discussion was conducted to confirm the information obtained from the
archival searches and to gain insight into the roles and functions of the PAC.
The focus group discussion involved three parliamentary officers attached to the PAC. These
officers hold responsibility for maintaining documents, arranging for PAC meetings,
investigations and hearings, coordinating PAC investigations according to the available
expertise in various government agencies (particularly the NAD), as well as recording and
maintaining reports of activities undertaken. A list of questions was emailed to the
respondents prior to the discussion session so they could prepare beforehand. The questions
prepared were based on the results of the archival search performed earlier. During the
discussion, respondents were allowed to speak freely about their experiences and were
prompted for additional information. The information obtained from the archival searches
and focus group discussion was then analysed descriptively to generate the information
presented in this chapter.
The effectiveness of Malaysia's PAC was examined using the attributes suggested by
Stapenhurst et al. (2005), as the authors claimed that the attributes contribute to an ideal
PAC. Stapenhurst et al. (2005) analysed data collected from 51 national and state/provincial
parliaments in Commonwealth countries in Asia, Australasia, Canada and the United
Kingdom. The 17 attributes of an 'ideal committee' were introduced based on their findings.
The attributes cover two sets of factors deemed of great importance to understanding how the
capacity ofPACs can be built. The two sets of factors are (i) institutional design of the PAC,
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and (ii) PAC functions and member behaviour. Institutional design includes the features,
characteristics, power and mandate of the PAC, while PAC functions and member behaviour
are best practices. The study also identified the following institutional factors that largely
account for the success of the PAC: the focus on the government's financial activities rather
than its policies, the power to investigate all past and present government expenses, the
power to follow up on government action in response to its recommendations, and the
Committee's relationship with the Auditor General. Best practices associated with PAC
members include that members must act in a non-partisan fashion and should try to have a
good working relationship with each other, and that the PAC should always strive to achieve
consensus among its members
Findings and Discussions
This section includes a description and discussion of Malaysia's federal PAC, and an
assessment of the PAC using the attributes of an ideal committee defined by Stapenhurst et
al. (2005).
,
Malaysia's Public Accounts Committee
The description and discussion of Malaysia's federal PAC is organised as follows: (1)
authority and structure, (2) relationship and resources, (3) power, roles and practices, (4)
meetings, reporting and follow up, and (5) examples of cases investigated by the PAC.
(1) Authority and Structure
Malaysia's federal PAC is formed immediately after the beginning of each Parliament. The
present Parliament, the is", began in July 2013. It also marked the appointment of PAC
members who will hold office until 2018. The establishment of the PAC dates back to the
first Parliament in 1959, although its role became prevalent only in the 21
5t
century. The
House of Representatives has five select committees, one of which is the PAC. Members of
the PAC are selected from representatives in the House by another committee called the
Committee of Selection. The Committee of Selection, comprised of the Deputy Prime
Minister and the leaders of all main political parties with members in the House, selects
members and forwards the names of its candidates to the Chairman of the House of
Representatives. Members are selected based on their expertise and their ability to ensure the
effectiveness of the PAC. In addition, the Committee of Selection works to ensure fair
representation from both the government and the opposition. However, the appointment of
the PAC's Chairman and Deputy is made through a motion brought by the Prime Minister
and debated in the House of Representatives.
The regulations governing the PAC stipulate that it must consist of between six and twelve
members, excludin~ the chair and deputy chair. The PAC, including the Committee
appointed by the 13t Parliament, has always consisted of the maximum number of members.
Although there is no specific requirement regarding which representatives may serve on the
PAC, government ministers are not allowed to be selected. There is also no specific
requirement in terms of the appointment of the Chairman of the committee. The appointment
is determined through the approval of the House, and the position could be occupied by a
member from either the government or the opposition. However, by convention, the
Chairman's position has gone to a member from the government whilst the Deputy Chairman
has always been a member of the opposition. If the Chairman and Deputy Chairman are
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absent from a Committee meeting, the remaining Committee members shall elect anyone
member from among the remaining Committee members to act as a Chairman to preside over
that meeting only. Even in this situation, a minister is still not allowed to be nominated or
appointed to, or to act as a member or Chairman of the PAC.
The current PAC is composed of nine members from the government and five from the
opposition. This reflects the composition of the House, where the majority of representatives
are from the government. However, the 9:5 ratio has always been used, even when there were
fewer opposition representatives in previous Parliaments. This adds to the credibility of the
PAC's reports and conclusions and explains why PAC reports have rarely been challenged
and have been used as reference points for debates in Parliament. The PAC obtains its
authority and power through Parliament, and all rules regarding meetings, reports and
procedures that apply to Parliament also apply to the PAC. The PAC shares facilities and
resources, including human resources, with Parliament. At present, only one full time
administrative staff is dedicated solely to the PAC, while other officers are shared with other
offices of Parliament.
(2) Relationship and Resources
As indicated earlier, the financial accountability function of Parliament rests with two
institutions: the PAC and the NAD. Thus, this explains the close cooperation between the
PAC and the NAD. The PAC relies on the Auditor General's reports in initiating
investigations of misconduct. The Auditor General is independent of the Cabinet and the
PAC, thus the PAC cannot override the Auditor General's directives to staff within the NAD.
The PAC maintains a formal relationship with the NAD but it can utilise the NAD's staff and
expertise for its investigation and reporting tasks, as the PAC has only one full time
administrative staff member of its own. For other tasks, the PAC has the authority to mobilise
additional NAD staff. Besides the authority to utilise NAD staff, the PAC also has power to
summon government bodies and agencies to supply them with information and assistance.
Parliamentary staff and officers can also be called upon to assist the PAC in its work, with
regard to the arrangement of meetings, investigations and related tasks.
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In 1992, the Parliamentary Services Act 1963 (Act 394) was repealed by the Constitution
(Amendments) Act 1992 (Act A837). This abolished the PAC's right to a financial allocation
and control over its finances. Thus, at the present time, the PAC has no control over its
budget or of any funds allocated to it. The position of the PAC as one of Parliament's select
committees allows it to use parliamentary resources, as we11 as the resources of other
government agencies. The members of the PAC are not entitled to any emoluments.
(3) Power, Roles and Practices
The PAC obtains its authority and power through the constitutional provisions enacted for
Parliament. These provisions are called the Peraturan-Peraturan Majlis Mesyuarat Dewan
Rakyat (Standing Orders of the Dewan Rakyat of Malaysia), and they provide the rules for
the House of Representatives. The rules were created by the House based on Part 62( I) of the
Federal Constitution. Section 77(1) Standing Orders (Parliament of Malaysia, no date) which
outlines the roles and responsibilities of the PAC, authorises it to inspect:
1. the accounts of the Federation and the appropriation of the sums granted by
Parliament to meet the public expenditure;
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2. such accounts of public authorities and other bodies administering public funds as
may be laid before the House;
3. reports of the Auditor General laid before the House in accordance with Article 107 of
the Constitution; and
4. such other matters as the Committee may think fit, or that may be referred to the
Committee by the House.
Based on the provisions of the Standing Orders, the PAC is responsible for ascertaining that
government ministries, departments and agencies ensure that:
1. all public moneys are accurately accounted for;
2. all payments are made based on approved legislation, have been correctly charged and
are supported;
3. all assets are used, controlled and disposed of in accordance with specified rules;
4. all accounts and records have been correctly and accurately maintained; and
5. public moneys have been used according to approved provisions.
In fulfilling its responsibilities, and as one of Parliament's select committees, the PAC has the
power to summon witnesses and demand documents and information necessary for its
investigations. It is an offence for an individual that has been summoned by the PAC to be
absent or to fail to supply relevant information.
The PAC has the authority to comment on the implementation of any programmes or
activities by government ministries, departments and agencies, with respect to whether the
initiatives are beneficial and achieving their intended objectives. The PAC also has the power
to provide advice on the use of public funds, particularly when it suspects waste or excessive
spending. The comments and input provided by the PAC have always been used when the
government drafts its development plans and prepares a new budget.
The Auditor General presents an audit report to Parliament three times a year. Immediately
after tabling the audit report in the House of Representatives, the Auditor General will brief
the PAC on his findings. The PAC will then respond to the Auditor General's findings by
mobilizing the NAD, as well as the AGD's staff, to assist in its investigation. The
parliamentary officers attached to the PAC will help to coordinate resources to meet the
PAC's needs. This may involve, among other things, arranging meetings of PAC members,
and summoning individuals to attend questioning sessions. The PAC also has the capacity to
summon any individual, officer or department to assist in its investigation.
Approximately 80 percent of PAC investigations are based on the Auditor General's reports.
The PAC also initiates enquiries and investigations that it deems necessary to examine issues
highlighted by various parties. Some of the issues not in the Auditor General's reports that
the PAC has investigated in recent years include reports dealing with the Port Klang Free
Zone (PKFZ), missing jet engines belonging to the air force and the collapse of a stadium.
PAC investigations extend beyond those related to financial issues and include performance
reviews involving government ministries, departments and agencies. Nevertheless, the PAC
is always careful to limit its investigations tothe use of government and public money. There
are instances where highlighted issues involve public listed companies; in such cases, the
PAC has to draw the line between examining the use of public and private sector funds. In
cases involving the private sector, the PAC would investigate through the central bank, Bank
Negara Malaysia.
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The PAC is obligated to report directly to the legislature. After the PAC is satisfied with its
investigation and a consensus is reached by its members, a report will be submitted to the
House of Representatives with recommendations for further action. However, the PAC can
only make recommendations for follow up by the relevant authorities. Its report also serves as
a reference point for debate in Parliament.
(4) Meetings, Reporting and Follow Up
It is compulsory for the PAC to meet after the Auditor General presents an audit report.
Subsequent to a briefing provided by the Auditor General, the PAC will determine the issues
raised by the report and the need for additional meetings. In addition, the PAC also meets
when issues are raised either in Parliament, or by the public. The Committee has been quite
active, recording at least one PAC meeting every month. In 2009, the PAC recorded a record
high of 40 meetings over the course of the year.
Prior to a full meeting of the PAC, a Pre-Council meeting will be held. The Pre-Council
consists of the PAC's Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Secretary, together with the Auditor
General. The focus of the Pre-Council meeting is on issues highlighted in the Auditor
, General's report. The Auditor General will explain the issues and provide recommendations
on relevant questions to ask the responsible officers during the PAC's investigations. The
Auditor General's involvement does not stop at the Pre-Council meeting: he also attends the
full PAC meeting and may be requested to provide additional information when necessary. A
PAC meeting includes all 14 committee members, representatives from the NAD, AGD,
MOF, EPU and the Public Service Department. The responsible officers from the respective
ministries, departments and agencies will be called upon to explain the weaknesses or issues
raised in the Auditor General's report, and any remedial action their organisations have taken
to address them. In the event that the PAC is not satisfied with an explanation provided, the
PAC's Chairman can request further confirmation and suggestions from the Auditor General.
It is compulsory for responsible officers to attend and respond at meetings and hearings when
the PAC summons them. If a responsible officer fails to attend without providing a
reasonable explanation, the PAC could choose to:
1. refuse to accept the submission of the representatives brought forward for
investigation;
2. summon the official to provide a proper explanation of the inability to be present at
the hearing; or
3. set another date for re-investigation of the respective officer.
PAC meetings, investigations and hearings involve only PAC members and relevant
individuals. As such, the meetings are closed to the public. All meetings, discussions and
investigations are recorded verbatim; drafts of the transcripts of proceedings are reviewed and
confirmed by the relevant parties before they are printed. After the end of a meeting, the PAC
will prepare a PAC Meeting Report with the cooperation of the NAD. The Report will
contain the issues raised, their cause, details of the investigation, explanations from the
responsible officers under investigation, and the Committee's comments, recommendations,
and decisions. The PAC's power extends to suggesting action to be taken by certain
individuals, and government ministries, department and agencies. The Report will then be
presented to the House of Representatives. PAC reports are not debated in the House, as it is
presumed that the content was properly deliberated during PAC meetings, which include a
fair representation of members from the government and the opposition. Documentation and
11
reports relating to ongoing investigations are not made available to the public; the public can
only access summarized reports after an investigation has been concluded and closed.
Paragraph 304(b) of the Treasury Instructions stipulates that the following actions shall be
taken after a PAC Meeting Report has been tabled in Parliament (House of Representatives):
1. The Treasury of Malaysia shall notify the responsible officers of the relevant
ministries, departments or agencies of specific content concerning them and their
organisations in the report;
2. The responsible officers shall embark on implementing the recommendations made by
the PAC, and report to the Treasury on any action taken as well as on the current
status of the issues concerned;
3. The Treasury shall prepare a final memorandum detailing the actions taken by the
responsible officers in response to the issues raised, and forward this to the PAC. The
memorandum shall be prepared immediately, and is tabled at the following PAC
meeting for deliberation and further suggestions. ,
The above instructions show that the PAC does follow up on it recommendations through the
final memorandum and enforcement of the Treasury. There is no requirement for the PAC to
present an annual report or any other performance report to Parliament.
(5) Examples of Cases Investigated
As indicated previously, the PAC investigates various cases highlighted in the Auditor
General's report, as well as cases raised by members of Parliament involving ministers and
top officials of ministries, departments and agencies, cases involving huge sums of money
and fraud, as well as smaller cases. The following section cites investigations of several
significant cases that have been officially published.
Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ). In 1990, the government decided to upgrade Port Klang into
a centre for regional loading and distribution. A 'Mega Distribution Hub' was established
with a development project called the PKFZ. The objective of the PKFZ was to develop the
free zone concept by combining the activities of a Free Trade Zone and a Free Industrial
Zone in one area. The project was developed on a 1,000-acre parcel of land that offered •
extensive distribution and manufacturing facilities. The PKFZ also offered various
investment incentives to companies willing to locate in the zone. These incentives included
tax exemptions on most products and services, subsidies, the participation of wholly foreign
owned enterprises, free repatriation of capital and profits and incentives for research and
development, training and export. The PKFZ was based on the model of the Jebel Ali Free
Zone in Dubai and was launched in July 2004. However, in 2007, the Auditor General's
report on the Port Klang Authority (PKA) highlighted huge cost overruns amounting to
RM 3.5 billion (USD 1.1 billion) associated with the Port Klang Free Zone. The original cost
of setting up the integrated free zone was supposed to be RM1.8 billion, but this had
increased to RM4.6 billion by the time the project was completed four years later. The PAC
investigated the PKA and made recommendations, one of which resulted in an independent
auditor being appointed in 2008 to conduct an audit. The auditor's PKFZ Position Review
and Report were published in May 2009 and the audit report received huge coverage in the
mass media. Further PAC investigations were held, resulting in the government's decision to
form a special PKFZ Task Force in September 2009 to review the problems and make
recommendations. The PAC then issued its final report with suggested actions on 27 October
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2009. This resulted in the arrest of five people who subsequently faced criminal charges for
misconduct in administering and financing the PKFZ (PAC, 2009).
Malaysia International Tuna Port (MITP). The Fisheries Department of Malaysia built a
complex for fish landing in Penang in 1979 and handed over the complex to the Malaysia
Fisheries Development Authority (LKIM) in 1984. In 2002, LKIM's board of directors
approved a proposal by Bindforce Sdn. Bhd. to build and operate an international tuna port at
the site in collaboration with LKIM. A MoA was signed in May 2002. In 2003, the
government's Economic Planning Unit (EPU) approved the privatization of the port, resulting
in the formation of a new company, Malaysian International Tuna Port Sdn. Bhd. (MITP Sdn.
Bhd.). However, the Auditor General's report in 2009 raised the issue of the abandonment of
the project after the government had spent RM95 million. The PAC started an investigation
shortly thereafter by calling on several parties responsible for the project. The Committee
also conducted a site visit in 2011. In this case, the PAC assessed the amount of possible loss
for the government, highlighted weaknesses in the due diligence assessment conducted by the
EPU, and indicated that the EPU should be held responsible. The PAC also highlighted the
negligence ofLKIM's management and representatives, and reported that the LKIM director
should have carefully observed the project to protect the government's interest. The PAC also
II pointed out conflict of interest issues in the project's management that had been overlooked.
The PAC's report resulted in action being taken against MITP Sdn. Bhd. and various
responsible parties involved in the project (PAC, 2011).
Rawang - Ipoh Electrified Double Tracking Project. The main components in this project
involved building an electrified rail system and upgrading existing track for the use of fast
trains with a top speed of 160km per hour. The Ministry of Transport (MOT) acted as the
project's implementing agency, with the responsibility for appointing contractors, organising
financial provisions and ensuring that the government's interests were protected during
project planning and execution. Malayan Railway Limited (KTMB), the end user of the
resultant infrastructure, was responsible for preparing a Statement of Needs. The
management and oversight function was undertaken by Syarikat Kinta Samudera-Opus
Consortium (KS-Opus), a project management company appointed by the MOT. In 2008, the
Auditor General's report highlighted numerous weaknesses found in the project. It mandated
the PAC to investigate and, in particular, to justify the project's value for money as the
project involved huge expenditures. In January 2010, the PAC reported abnormalities in the
terms of the contract between the government and the main contractor. The PAC suggested
• that several facilities be redistributed, and that the MOT take stern action against the project
managers who failed to supervise or oversee the project. The PAC also urged the MOF to
blacklist companies involved in the project that failed to live up to their obligations to the
project (PAC, 2010).
The Auditor General's 2012 report also identified many concerns that the PAC is currently
investigating (NAD, 2013). Among others, the PAC will call on top officials to explain (i)
weaknesses found at the Ministry of Education over the financial management of security
control services, (ii) the National Film Development Corporation's (FINAS) 'patchy and
inconsistent' financial management from 2009 to 2012, and (iii) the surge in the cost of the
KLIA2 project (NAD, 2014a).
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Assessment of PAC Performance
Every year the Auditor General's Report highlights cases of misappropriation of funds,
potential civil servant fraud and government overspending. These incidents result in the
public questioning of government accountability, and criticism of the role played by the PAC.
The parliamentary Committee of Selection, in addressing the criticism, exercises care in
selecting PAC members by ensuring that the Committee comprises members of diverse
expertise, including those with an accounting background. Although Malaysia's PAC has
been actively pursuing issues raised by the Auditor General, it has been criticised for (among
other things) failing to tackle issues of graft and financial misappropriation, taking a long
time to investigate and conclude issues, and lacking the power to probe into cases raised.
However, these criticisms have been raised mainly on the Internet by social media. In order
to assess whether the PAC is effective, the data gathered, described and discussed in the
previous section were compared to the 17 attributes of an ideal PAC developed in
Stapenhurst et al. (2005). An assessment based on these 'ideal committee' attributes would
help to establish the credibility of Malaysia's federal PAC. Table 1 (below) illustrates the \
attributes of Malaysia's PAC.
Table 1: Assessment of the Effectiveness of Malaysia's Federal PAC
No. Attributes YeslNo
1 The committee is small; committees seem to work well with 5-11 members, ./
none of whom should be government ministers.
2 Senior opposition figures are associated with the PAC's work, and x
probably chair the committee.
3 The Chair of the committee is a senior parliamentarian, fair-minded and ./
is respected by parliament
4 The committee is appointed for the full term of the parliament. ./
5 The committee is adequately resourced, with an experienced clerk and a x
com petent researcher( s).
6 There is clarity on the committee's role and responsibilities. ./
7 The committee meets frequently and regularly. ./
8 Hearings are open to the public; a full verbatim transcript and summary minutes x
are quickly available for public distribution.
9 A steering committee plans the committee's work in advance and ./
prepares an agenda for each meeting to the full committee.
10 The typical witness is a senior public servant (the "accounting officer")
accompanied by the officials that have detailed understanding of the issues ./
under examination.
11 The Auditor's Report is automatically referred to the committee and the auditor ./
meets with the committee to go over the highlights of the report.
12 In addition to issues raised by the auditor, the committee occasionally decides ./
to investigate other matters.
13 The committee strives for some consensus in its reports. ./
14 The committee issues formal substantive reports to parliament at least annually. ./
15 The committee has established a procedure with the government for following
up its recommendations and is informed about what, if any, action has been ./
taken.
16 In all its deliberations, the committee uses the auditor as an expert advisor. ./
17 Parliament holds an annual debate on the work of the committee. x
,
Source: Stapenhurst et al. (2005, p. 25)
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As evidenced in the table, Malaysia's PAC possesses l3 out of the 17 attributes of an ideal
committee. The PAC is relatively small, excludes government ministers, and is appointed for
the full term of Parliament. Abiding by regulations, the PAC's maximum number of members
is 12, government ministers are not permitted to serve on the committee, and the appointment
of members is aligned to the full term of Parliament.
,
As indicated previously, the PAC meets frequently (at least once a month), and a Pre-Council
meeting precedes the full committee meeting to ensure that important issues and related
matters are properly covered. The roles, responsibilities and powers of the PAC and its
members are stipulated clearly in the Standing Orders of the Dewan Rakyat (House of
Representatives). In general, 80 percent of the PAC's investigations result from issues raised
in the Auditor General's Report, while the remaining cases are initiated by current issues
raised by members of Parliament. The PAC issues a formal report to Parliament after
completing its investigation and obtaining the consensus of its members. Although the
Treasury Instructions require the Treasury of Malaysia to conduct a follow up and report back
to the PAC, actual practice requires other government ministries, department and agencies to
also report directly to the PAC on the results of their own follow up.
Although the PAC has never been chaired by a senior opposition figure, the Deputy
Chairman comes from the opposition and the two top positions are determined in a
parliamentary debate. In addition, senior opposition members do receive appointments to the
PAC. Malaysia is not the only country where senior opposition members do not typically
chair the PAC. Stapenhurst, Pelizzo and O'Brien (2012) highlighted that Australia also
represents an interesting exception, as the country considers it advantageous to have a
government member as chairman to better assist with the implementation of the PAC's
recommendations. From 1992 onwards, the PAC has not had its own budget. Instead, it
shares resources with Malaysia's Parliament. Although the PAC does not have many
resources of its own, several Parliamentary officers are tasked with the responsibility of
assisting the PAC. The PAC also has the power to summon resources, expertise, documents
and other support from various government entities. While PAC meetings are not open to the
public, a full verbatim transcript of meeting and hearing proceedings is submitted to
Parliament, and summaries of the PAC's reports are published on PAC's website. Parliament,
however, does not hold annual debates on the work of the PAC.
Therefore, it is evidenced that the Malaysian federal PAC has the attributes needed to be
effective. The recurring issues highlighted in the Auditor General's Report are not the result
of an ineffective PAC, but may be due to various other reasons such as an inability to take
action and limited resources in conducting investigation and research. In addition, since the
PAC's power is limited to investigating and forwarding its findings and recommendations to
other parties, it is up to these parties (including the judiciary) to take further action -
including penalizing offenders.
Conclusion
This chapter's discussion and conclusion are based on publicly available archival documents,
as well as on a focus group discussion with three officers from Parliament. It covers only the
appreciation of the PAC's role and performance, and an evaluation of whether or not it is
considered an 'ideal committee'. Based on the findings, Malaysia's PAC has been actively
pursuing issues highlighted in the Auditor General's Report, as well as other issues involving
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government entities. Notable cases, such as the Port Klang Free Zone and the Rawang-Ipoh
electrified double tracking project, have been discussed here. Malaysia's PAC is considered
almost ideal since it possesses 13 of the 17 attributes of an ideal committee. The four
attributes that the PAC does not possess include: the Committee does not have a senior
member of the opposition as its chairman, the Committee does not have its own budget, the
Committee does not hold public hearings, and there is no annual debate in Parliament on the
work of the Committee. However, the findings show that the lack of these four attributes has
not hampered the work of the PAC; recurring problems uncovered by the Committee, such as
the misappropriation of government funding, are due to a lack of enforcement by other
responsible agencies.
This chapter examined the PAC at the federal government level in Malaysia. Future research
could look into the PAC at the state level, and could explore the factors that influence the
PAC's effectiveness. Research involving interviews with members of the PAC, members of
Parliament and officials from government ministries, departments and agencies to gain
further insight into the effectiveness of the PAC and improving government transparency and
accountability would also be worthwhile.
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